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WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL IN INSURANCE
POLICY LITIGATION
Clarence Morris t
"The tendency on the part of the courts to treat insurance
contracts as standing in a class by themselves and to pro-
tect against forfeitures invoked in defense of honest claims
has led to much subtlety. As Professor Woodruff says
'What do they know of the law of the insurance
contract who only the law of contract knowf"
-POUND, 1.1
Indexes to the great nineteenth century insurance texts do not
list waiver and estoppel.' But times have changed. The 1951 third
edition of Vance on Insurance enfolds an excellent and important sev-
enty-six page "Waiver & Estoppel" chapter-about a fourteenth of the
book's bulk. What has fostered this growth in the last hundred years?
My thesis is that waiver and estoppel are two of several guises that
cloak the courts' part in changing insurance from a service safely bought
only by sophisticated businessmen to a commodity bought with confi-
dence by untrained consumers. Judges, at the urging of policyholders'
advocates, have used waiver and estoppel to convert insurance from a
custom-made document designed in part by knowing buyers to a brand-
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. LL.B., 1925, University of Col-
orado; LL.M., 1926, Columbia University.
1. Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 385, 393, 153 N.E. 844,
846 (1926).
2. See, e.g., ANGMLL, FM AND Liv INStJRAN C (1854); ANNVSL4Y, MAtRnM
INSURANC (1808); ARxouL, MARmm INSuRANC. (1848).
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name staple sold over the counter by mine-run salesmen to the trusting
public.
Seventeenth and eighteenth century marine insurance contracts
were handwritten; hull and cargo owners and their brokers knew insur-
ance as thoroughly as the underwriters. When a marine policy buyer
entertained a proposal of a warranty, he bargained for important pre-
mium concessions and knew the courts would construe the warranty
strictly against him.3 American draftsmen-lawyers, sometimes in the
hire of fly-by-night companies, proliferated fine print in the nineteenth
century fire and life insurance policies. Companies, spurred by com-
petition, debased their product (as the Germans did their linen).' Re-
strictions on coverage, not noticed or not understood by policyholders
at the time of issue, became painfully clear after uncovered losses which
policyholders would have paid to cover. The insurance market might
have soured had not the law stepped in and afforded consumer protec-
tion greater than companies intended to sell.
Of course this process of favoring consumers can be carried too
far. Insurance companies need and are entitled to reasonable limits
on their responsibilities; the public is prejudiced when company liabili-
ties are by generous caprice stretched over risks that cannot be profitably
underwritten at a just premium. By and large, however, the courts
have not been overgenerous to the public. Judges have limited their
use of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel because of their awareness
of important underwriting realities.
Underwriting cannot be discussed intelligently when cases involv-
ing unrelated problems are lumped together because of abstract legal
similarities. I shall avoid this difficulty by classifying cases according
to kinds of insurance, rather than technical types of legal problems.
FIRE INSURANCE
Sole Ownership Clauses
Before 1943 most fire insurance policies stipulated that unless the
policy expressly provided otherwise, it was void if the policyholder
owned less than an unmortgaged, undivided fee. Of course much in-
sured property is mortgaged, and often a co-owner insures only his
interest in property. Ownership warranties became harmless by the
3. See, e.g., De Hahn v. Hartley, 1 T.R. 343, 99 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1786),
in which the court strained at a technicality to find breach of marine insurance war-
ranty-a breach which could not possibly have increased the hazards of the insured
voyage.
4. See JH ING, LAW AS A M4ANS TO AN END 364 (Modern Legal Philosophy
Series vol. 5, Husick transl. 1913).
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terms of the policy when the interest of the policyholder was accurately
described-as it usually was. But laymen are likely to think of "insur-
ing a house;" the idea of "insuring an interest in a house" is legalistic
and unnatural to the man in the street. So a policy buyer often did
not think to tell the local agent that he had a limited interest or had
borrowed money on his property. When property was co-owned by
husband and wife, and when the local agent was only an order taker,
many a policy afforded no protection; thirty years ago courts often
held that insurance companies incurred no liability in this kind of case,'
and much insurance on co-owned homes was worthless.6
Companies wrote sole-ownership clauses into their fire insurance
policies on the theory that part owners and mortgagors were, as a class,
less desirable customers than fee owners of clear property. This theory,
of course, has something to it; moral hazard can be ruinous to insur-
ance companies. Before 1943 some policies called for payment of the
actual cash value of property destroyed 1-- they did not limit coverage
(as policies now do) to the value of the insured's interest.' "Valued
policies" (in which the company agrees to pay the face of the policy
in event of total loss) are required by law in some states 9 and may
aggravate the moral hazard of a mortgaged or co-owned risk. Those
who have less to lose have some tendency to take less care. From the
company point of view, the sole-ownership clause tightened up risk
selection; it protected companies-automatically-from moral hazard.
But the clause killed off much wheat to exterminate a few tares; it often
uncovered risks that the company would have gladly taken for the pre-
mium charged-risks uncovered by operation of the clause when a
clumsy local agent neglected to describe the limited interest of an ac-
ceptable customer. Mortgaged, jointly held, and leased properties are
the bulk of insured properties; a company taking none of these risks
excludes itself from most of the market. A company wanting to take
limited ownership into account in its underwriting need only ask about
title and mortgages, and then act accordingly. Sole-ownership clauses
worked unfairly so often that courts "found" ways to circumvent
5. See, e.g., Pollack v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 362 Ill. 313, 199 N.E. 816 (1936).
6. Goble, Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 37
COLUm. L. Rzv. 410, 418 (1937).
7. This was fortunately so in the policy in Merritt v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 42 Iowa
11 (1875). Otherwise the court that allowed a recovery on a policy on property in
which insured had only a homestead (life) estate might have had difficulty in giving
a judgment that would cover the loss.
8. However, an insured with a limited interest may insure interests of his co-
owners for them. Courts are quick to find that the policy is intended to protect inter-
ests of all co-owners. See, e.g., Welsh v. London Assurance Corp., 151 Pa. 607, 25
At. 142 (1892).
9. See, e.g., Ky. Ryv. STAT. § 298.130 (1948); Ni4B. Rv. STAr. § 44-380 (1943).
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them.1 In 1943 the clause was dropped from the New York Standard
Fire Policy, and as other states followed suit, the clause disappeared
from fire insurance policies." But much viable insurance law of waiver
and estoppel was made in sole-ownership clause cases, and the lessons
these cases teach are more than historic.
The standard theory of waiver is this: When a contract by its terms
provides that a party's liabilities are conditional he may widen his re-
sponsibility by telling the other party that he will be bound even though
the condition does not come to pass. A buyer agrees to take an auto-
mobile if it will fit into his garage; it turns out to be three inches too
long; the buyer says he will take it anyway; he may no longer insist on
the length condition.
Insurance companies needed a procedure for waiving sole-owner-
ship clauses. They tried to meet this need by saying in their policies
that the clause operates only if the policyholder's limited interest is not
described in policy blanks or in endorsements. Disputes arose only
when a policyholder with a limited interest claimed some other form
of waiver. These waivers of limited ownership, not appearing on the
face of the policy, were seldom explicit; a local agent intending to write
a policy covering a limited interest was likely to do so in the authorized
written form. A non-policy waiver which was almost express is illus-
trated by Isaac v. Donegal & Conoy Mut. Fire Ins. Co.' In that case
a fire policy covered a store building and its contents. Three pro-
prietors were named as insureds. One proprietor's personal furniture
was in the building. When a local agent delivered the policy his cus-
tomers told him about the furniture and their desire to cover it. The
agent said the policy did cover the furniture. The court rejected the
company defense of breach of the sole-ownership clause on the ground
(among others) of waiver. No doubt the company would have been
willing to insure the furniture at the premium rate which had been
collected. The local agent either thought he was selling such protec-
tion or was too lazy to write a proper policy. Nevertheless, he clumsily
tried to do business his company wanted to do. Injustice of the com-
pany's position probably impelled the court's holding more than did
the technical applicability of the doctrine of waiver. In another inter-
esting example, Hoffman v. Neshannock Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,' the orig-
inal insured sold a half interest in the property to his brother.
10. In Texas, e.g., either spouse is a sole and unconditional owner of community
property for insurance purposes. 13 TZxAs L. Rv. 236 (1935).
11. See PATTMS N, INSURANCZ 504 n.3 (3d ed. 1955).
12. 308 Pa. 439, 162 Atl. 300 (1932). See also Early v. Mutual Fire Ins Co., 178
Pa. 631, 36 Atl. 195 (1897).
13. 156 Pa. Super. 13, 39 A.2d 145 (1944).
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The policy stipulated that if any change in interest occurred it would
become void. The local agent lunk-headedly told the purchasing
brother that the policy nevertheless remained in force. The pur-
chasing brother sent a premium to the company's home office with a
covering letter telling about his purchase and asking for an endorse-
ment. The company did not answer his letter but kept his money. The
house burned a month later. The court called failure to respond a
waiver, and gave the customer the protection he deserved.
The holdings in both of these cases were also justified on the
theory of estoppel. 4  Standard statement of the estoppel principle
runs this way: One who represents a present or past fact to another who
relies on that representation is estopped to deny the truth of that repre-
sentation to the detriment of the relier. A classroom example of the
doctrine is the case of a bystander who represents that his own horse
belongs to a seller and later tries to assert his title against the buyer
who has relied on that representation. The two sole-ownership cases
are much like this horse case. Insurance company agents lulled cus-
tomers into believing they were covered and accepted premiums adequate
for coverage. To allow breach of title-warranty defenses after loss
seems most unjust. But reliance to detriment on representations about
coverage of a fire policy limited by a sole-ownership clause only ag-
gravates the evil of the clause-which also denudes customers to whom
no such representations are made.
For example, in Mears v. Farmers Cooperative Fire Ins. Co."
adjusters investigating a loss found out that insured farm buildings
were on leased ground. The company immediately denied liability.
After their disclaimer the farmer received a premium notice and a re-
quest for payment within thirty days. The court took the position
that the bill was inconsistent with the disclaimer, and was evidence on
which the jury, in absence of explanation, could find a waiver. The
court ruled that the company was not entitled to a directed verdict
without calling its billing clerks to the witness stand and adducing
proof that the notice was sent by mistake. Estoppel cannot be bot-
tomed on this assessment notice-the farmer was not prejudiced by
receiving it; he had already suffered his loss which was uncovered by
breach of the ownership warranty. The court's theory is not that
the farmer was misled; it let the jury find that the company
relinquished its rights intentionally.' Would the court have let the
14. See also Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hart, 149 II1. 513, 36 N.E. 990 (1894), in which
a waiver theory would be clumsy and estoppel alone was used.
15. 112 Vt. 519, 28 A.2d 698 (1942).
16. But see Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 573, 55 N.W. 1025 (1893). Note
the early date.
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leased-ground stipulation evaporate if that stipulation were in the
public interest? Surely proof of the premium notice is meagre evidence
of an intention to relinquish the defense; the juror who finds company
intention to waive the defense on this proof is not the wisest of reason-
able men.
Perkins v. Century Ins. Co.17 is another type of case hard to jus-
tify on either waiver or estoppel theories. A policyholder bought a
series of annual policies on her dwelling. The mortgage on her prop-
erty was foreclosed. When her policy year ended she told the local
agent not to renew because she had lost the property. He explained
her equity of redemption and recommended that she buy a policy writ-
ten to protect it. She agreed to take such a policy. Nevertheless his
clerk merely copied her old policy and, of course, misdescribed her
interest so that the ownership warranty was broken. The mistake was
discovered after a fire broke out while she was taking steps to redeem.
This is not quite a waiver case, because nothing was done by the com-
pany to relinquish its rights under the policy as written. It is not
quite an estoppel case because no representation was made after the
policy was issued-unless it is said that delivery of the policy was an
implied representation of coverage. Perhaps the best traditional argu-
ment is that mutual mistake entitles the policyholder to relief. Even
the company looked on the case as one that might call for reformation
and argued that the policyholder could sue on the policy only after an
equity court had reformed it. But the union of law and equity had
proceeded far enough in Michigan for this argument to lack appeal;
the court held the policyholder's case strong enough to go to the
jury.
Whenever the local agent knew about limitations on the policy
buyer's interest, courts found some way to protect the buyer against
the rigors of the sole-ownership clause.'8 Waiver and estoppel were
often in the opinions in these cases. Election, another theory more-
or-less peculiar to insurance law, was also available to the courts. An
election holding runs as follows: A local agent's knowledge of defect
in the policyholder's title is knowledge of his company, and if with
this knowledge the company keeps the policyholder's premium, the
company elects to waive breach of the sole-ownership clause. Per-
17. 303 Mich. 679, 7 N.W.2d 106 (1942).
18. Spern v. Insurance Co., 131 Pa. Super. 595, 200 Atl. 196 (1938); Welch v.
Fire Ins. Ass'n, 120 Wis. 456, 98 N.W. 227 (1904). Contra, Lindley v. Franklin Fire
Ins. Co., 152 S.W.2d 1109 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1941), which held that a life tenant
was barred by a sole ownership clause in a policy issued with an attached application
limiting agent's authority to waive. See also Home Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 100 S.W.2d
91 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937).
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haps the most realistic way of looking at these cases is that local agents
with knowledge of policy buyers' needs have authority to make im-
plied warranties of fitness of the policies they sell. 9
The final step in judicial destruction of the sole-ownership-clause
trap is illustrated by French v. Patriotic Ins. Co. 'o The policyholder
insured a hotel standing on land he did not own. His policies war-
ranted that he owned the land in fee. They were issued on oral appli-
cation without inquiry about his title. Unanswered questions about the
innkeeper's title went forward on the agent's daily reports to some of
the insurance companies whose policies were -issued. The agent knew
nothing about the extent of his customer's interest and left this part of
the dailies blank. The court held that since the companies had not
asked about the policyholder's interest they could not defend on the
ground of breach of warranty of title; they could not take his money
for policies so written that he would not be protected if he had less
than a fee, lull him into a sense of security by not asking about title,
and then assert a sole-ownership-clause defense.2
Courts can chip away undesirable defenses at the rate of only one
case at a time. Diversity of temperaments of judges and the tradition
of judicial reluctance to interfere with private voluntary contracts might
have held back the hamstringing of title warranties; the surprise is that
courts moved as steadily as they did. But the final chapter was not
written by judges. The title warranties have now been taken out of
fire insurance policies by insurance commissions and the industry it-
self. Now a fire insurance company wishing to take into account in
its underwriting the extent of the insured's title makes inquiries and
looks for its protection to the law of representations rather than to the
law of warranties.
19. VANcn, INsuRANcE 540 n.21 (3d ed. 1951). In one respect the analogy is not
apt. Some fire insurance policies fit the need of buyers when issued, but become
worthless by their terms when a buyer later mortgages his property and the sole own-
ership clause becomes operative. In Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hart, 149 Ill. 513, 36 N.E. 990
(1894), a policy holder mortgaged two parts of his farm to different mortgagees. His
local agent told him that he needed only an indorsement for the mortgage that covered
the part of the farm on which the insured buildings stood. The court held the company
estopped to deny this representation. But see Stevens v Queen Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 335,51 N.W. 555 (1892), in which an agent's knowledge of an uncovering mortgage washeld no bar to Thie coml~any's breach-of-ownership warranty defense. Is the early date
of this case significant? Wouldn't the company have continued the risk for the sameprem um if they had been notified of the mortgage and asked to name the mortgage
as an additional insured?
20. 107 Colo. 275, 111 P.2d 893 (1941).
21. See also Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael, 167 Ind. 659, 74 N.E. 964 (1905) ;
Murphey v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 89 Okla. 207, 214 Pac. 695 (1922) ;
Allesina v. London & Liverpool & Globe Ins. Co., 45 Ore. 441, 78 Pac. 392 (1904);
Philadelphia Tool Co. v. British Am. Assurance Co., 132 Pa. 236, 19 At. 77 (1890).
But see Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Co., 154 Kan. 643, 121 P.2d 193
(1942); Wyandotte Brewing Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 144 Mich. 440, 108 N.W. 393
(1906).
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Other Insurance
Stipulations voiding fire insurance policies when a policy in an-
other company is issued on the same risk have not fared much better
than title warranties. Other-insurance clauses are, however, still used.
The original form of these clauses voided the policy when other insur-
ance was issued without the company's written permission; today some
policies less harshly provide that other insurance may be banned or its
amount limited by endorsement-an option companies rarely exercise.
The original theory of the other-insurance clause was (like that
of the sole-ownership clause) that it reduced moral hazard. This justi-
fication paled, however, when policy stipulations were adopted pro-
viding for pro rata loss sharing with other companies covering the
same risk and limiting total benefits from all companies to one single
indemnity. Only when policies are "valued" can multiple policies fo-
ment arson by increasing coverage to more than indemnity.
In early cases courts sometimes held for companies asserting other
insurance defenses and against policyholders who had countered with
substantial waiver and estoppel replies.22 In another early case the
policyholder recovered after proving a classic instance of estoppel.
Mentz v. Lancaster Fire Ins. Co.' was decided by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in 1876. A canny, though illiterate, policy buyer
asked the local agent who sold him policies in two companies about
endorsements on each policy permitting the other. The agent (with
whom the policies were left for safe keeping) told him proper endorse-
ments were attached to both policies; he relied on the truth of that
representation. The court estopped the company from denying its
agent's representation. The local agent was negligent or lazy or afraid
to let his companies know he was dividing business between them.
When a policyholder has given his company or its local agent no-
tice that he has bought an additional policy and the company has re-
mined silent until after loss, breach of the other-insurance clause is often
raised as a defense. Some courts call this silence an acquiescence that
estops the company from asserting its defense.24 A more comfortable
theory used by other courts is that a company knowing about such a
breach must either elect to cancel and return unearned premium or
waive its defense.'
22. Calmenson v. Equitable Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 92 Minn. 390, 100 N.W. 88
(1904) ; Baumgartel v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 136 N.Y. 547, 32 N.E. 990 (1893).
23. 79 Pa. 475 (1876).
24. In Phenix Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 143 Ill. 106, 32 N.E. 429 (1892), a local agent
told a general agent about other insurance and the general agent's silence was held
an adequate basis for estoppel.
25. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Grove, 225 Ill. 299, 74 N.E. 141 (1905) ; Glasscock v. Des
Moines Ins. Co., 125 Iowa 170, 100 N.W. 503 (1904); Swedish-Am. Ins. Co. v. Knut-
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New Jersey combined law and equity to give a policyholder his
premium's worth in a pair of interesting cases.2 In New Jersey Rub-
ber Co. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 7 a company had agreed
to write a $25,000 fire insurance policy on an industrial plant with the
understanding that the policyholder would get policies for $75,000 in
other companies (who would, of course, share the risk pro rata).
When the property burned several months later the policyholder had no
other insurance. The loss was less than $100,000, but more than
$25,000. Some days after the fire the company cancelled and returned
the premium accruing after cancellation. The cancellation notice said
that the company's withdrawal from the risk was subject to final ad-
justment of the pending claim. The law court in which the policy-
holder sued on the policy held that the policyholder's default was at
one time a defense, but cancellation was inconsistent with that defense
and waived his shortcoming. This holding standing alone would be
outrageous; the business-wise policyholder did not furnish a promised
important underwriting protection to the company. When the policy
was issued the company said in effect, "We are not big enough
to carry the whole risk; we'll carry one-fourth of it if you'll get other
companies to carry the other three-fourths." At the time of cancella-
tion it said in effect, "Without prejudice to your vested rights or our
defenses, we want none of this risk in the future." The company did
not forgive past sins and agree to pay four-fourths of the loss. Fortu-
nately the equity court came to the company's rescue and enjoined
the policyholder from collecting more than one-fourth of his loss. This
decree held the company substantially to the bargain it made; and re-
quired it to pay a sum that it had been willing to pay all along. The
holding is a triumph of understanding over an inflexible and wild use
of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.
Vacancy
Fire in an occupied house is more likely to be discovered and
fought in its early stages than one in an empty house; fire in an unused
building often goes unnoticed until it has made considerable headway.
Empty buildings attract children and tramps likely to start fires in them
in various ways. Empty buildings are often unwanted and their
son, 67 Kan. 71, 72 Pac. 526 (1903). In Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 294 Pa.
406, 144 Atl. 294 (1928), a local agent told an applicant for accident insurance he need
not list another policy he already had; the company was estopped from asserting mis-
representation in defense.
26. New Jersey Rubber Co. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 64 N.J.L. 580,
46 Atl. 777 (1900); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. New Jersey Rubber Co., 64
N.J. Eq. 338, 51 Atl. 451 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902).
27. 64 N.J.L. 580, 46 Atl. 777 (1900).
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owners may be tempted to burn them for insurance benefits. So
vacant buildings, more than occupied ones, are likely to catch fire and
be seriously damaged.
Companies tried to eliminate these risks by policy stipulations
withdrawing coverage after short periods of vacancy. Older policies
permitted periods of vacancy no longer than ten days. Unknowing or
forgetful ,householders who took extended trips without vacancy per-
mits became uninsured shortly after they left home. Even a sophisti-
cated policyholder whose short absence was prolonged by accident lost
his protection. Many courts developed antipathy for vacancy clauses;
in their eyes policyholders needed the protection withheld by the ten-
day vacancy clause and they seemed determined to protect the clause's
victims. They gained this end by interpreting the vacancy clause as
inapplicable to temporarily absent householders on the theory that a
house is not vacant or unoccupied so long as its occupants leave their
furniture and intend to return."8 This interpretation was rejected by
other courts. 9 Perhaps their thinking ran on purely doctrinal lines
and they thought this theory an unpermissible twisting of language;
perhaps, however, they were impressed with underwriting considera-
tions that led to the adoption of vacancy clauses-considerations of
more merit than the other fire policy stipulations discussed earlier.
Even in jurisdictions where courts have not trimmed operation
of vacancy clauses, policyholders are less likely to run afoul of them.
Since 1943 most companies have enlarged permissible periods of va-
cancy to sixty days. Many policies stipulate that the property may be
vacant for an unlimited period if it is a dwelling in an area served by
fire hydrants. Nearly all modern vacancy clauses are "suspensions"-
they do not specify that policies become void after a period of vacancy;
they merely hold protection in abeyance until the property is reoccupied.
Court respect for the underwriting justification of the vacancy
clause may account for modern cases in which company vacancy de-
fenses succeed over substantial claims of waiver and estoppel. 0 The
form of modern vacancy clauses, however, may have more to do with
these holdings than the clause's underwriting appeal. When the clause
withdraws protection only during vacancy after the permitted period and
resumes protection when the property is reoccupied, little sense can be
made of the proposition: A company with knowledge of vacancy waives
28. See, e.g., Foley v. Sonoma County Ins. Co., 18 Cal.2d 232, 115 P.2d 1 (1941).
29. See, e.g., Kinneer v. Southwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 322 Pa. 100, 104, 185
Atl. 194, 195 (1936).
30. Of the five vacancy clause cases in my sample the two in which companies
succeeded are Home Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 109 Ark. 324, 159 S.W. 1113 (1913); Conley
v. Queen Ins. Co., 256 Ky. 602, 76 S.W.2d 906 (1934).
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the vacancy defense unless it notifies the policyholder that the policy is
void and returns the unearned premium. Older policies, however,
stipulated that vacancy beyond the permitted period ended the com-
pany's obligations once and for all and some courts were quick to find
an election to waive these clauses based on the local agent's knowledge
of vacancy when the policy was issued. 1 Perhaps these courts were
moved by considerations not unlike those that led several others to erode
the vacancy clause defense by interpretation-that is, a conviction that
the clause is unfair.
Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kuhlman 2 is one of those cases in which
cancellation after loss proved costly to a company. The insured building
burned after having been vacant for several weeks beyond the period
permitted by the policy. After the fire the company sent cancellation
notice and in three letters urged the policyholder to cash a $3.90 check
for unearned premium. Nothing demonstrated a company intention
to waive its vacancy defense other than the technical inconsistency of its
attempt to cancel an already void policy. The company's behavior is
sensibly explained by saying that it was trying to foreclose any claim
for liability arising out of another fire; surely it had no other motive
to urge the policyholder to accept $3.90. The court's willingness to
let a jury find an intention to waive on such flimsy proof must have
been prompted by its distaste for the vacancy defense.33
The vacancy defense can be based on sound underwriting prin-
ciples and operate in the public interest. In some of the older policies
the permitted ten-day period was much too short; in cases of protected
dwelling houses, uses of any vacancy clause may be unwarranted. But
sound underwriting principles formulated with due regard for public
interest may call for the use of some kinds of vacancy clauses for some
sorts of risks. The courts should move with care in striking down
vacancy clause defenses or they may load all fire premiums with a charge
that should be borne by a few whose sub-standard risks call for higher
rates.
31. Security Ins. Co. v. Cook, 99 Okla. 275, 227 Pac. 402 (1924) ; Keller v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 239 Wis. 354, 300 N.W. 471 (1942). The Wisconsin statute,
Wis. STAT. § 203.13(1) (1947), on which the court purported to rely in the Keller
case provides: "Knowledge of an agent of a fire, casualty, or marine insurance com-
pany at the time the policy is issued or an application is made shall be knowledge of
the company, and any fact which breaches a condition of the policy and is known
to the agent when the policy is issued or the application made shall not void the policy
or defeat a recovery thereon in the event of loss." Note, the fact known to the agent
was vacancy when the policy was issued; the vacancy clause did not operate until
sixty days later; the court therefore, went beyond the bare letter of the statute.
32. 58 Neb. 488, 78 N.W. 936 (1899).
33. But see Madden v. Interstate Businessmen's Acc. Ass'n, 139 Minn. 6, 165
N.W. 482 (1917).
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Removal of Property Insured While in a Specified Building
Fire insurance policies on movables often stipulate that the property
is protected only while in a certain building. These location clauses are
underwriting essentials. Risk of loss often varies with the site-as
building materials and surrounding activities vary. Companies chart
locations of their risks and reduce shock loss resulting from bunch-
ing by cross-ceding or reinsurance. Floater protection that follows
the property can be written only at higher rates; it is available for those
who need it and will pay for it; it is often issued only on written applica-
tion including itemized schedules designed to protect the company
from inadequate premiums. The public is served by availability of
fixed place insurance sold at lower rates and marketed with less bother.
Of course, forgetful or unknowing buyers of fixed place insurance suf-
fer occasional misfortunes when they move their insured goods without
notice to their insurers. The courts have steadily held that the protec-
tion of fixed location policies cannot be stretched to new locations with-
out company consent.
34
Policies make no provision for changing the specified location; by
their terms removed property is uncovered unless and until it is re-
turned. In practice a policyholder planning a removal tells his local
agent about his plans and gets either an endorsement or a new policy
protecting his goods at their new location. In two Massachusetts cases
the court held that policyholders who relied on local agents' oral assur-
ances that the property would be insured in new locations could not
recover on their policies without proving the agents acted with author-
ity." This, of course, flaunts the theory of election. In Cummings v.
National Fire Ins. Co36 the Supreme Court of Michigan, in 1930, held
a removal defense unconscionable, and used the theory that notice to
the local agent is imputed to the company and put it to its election
either to continue protection or cancel and return unearned premium.
Failure to act, therefore, insured the goods at their new site. This
holding is proper in a world in which policyholders have been taught
to rely on local agents.
34. See, e.g., Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Alonzo, 112 Tex. 283, 246 S.W. 82 (1923).
Other cases are cited in PAMRSON, INSURANCS 479 nn.5 & 6 (3d ed. 1955). See also
health insurance policy limitations on coverage only for illnesses unconnected with
pre-policy bad health. Crowder v. General Acc., Fire, & Life Ins. Co., 180 Va. 117,
21 S.E.2d 772 (1942), held an application disclosing a prior injury does not affect
this limitation.
35. Parker v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 162 Mass. 479, 39 N.E. 179 (1895);
Blair v. National Reserve Ins. Co., 293 Mass. 86, 199 N.E. 337 (1936). Was it un-
fortunate that the 1895 precedent was directly in point when the question arose again
in 1936?
36. 251 Mich. 105, 231 N.W. 61 (1930).
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The holding in the Cummings case is not an attack on the location
clause's underwriting value; the clause is an essential limit on com-
pany liability advantageous to both the public and the insurance in-
dustry. Justification lies in another quarter-the propriety of requiring
companies to carry the risk that local agents will not regularize location
changes. Non-waiver clauses purport to put this risk on policyholders
by disclaiming agents' authority to make oral changes in the policy.
Perhaps the real waiver here is an institutional one; the industry has
fostered public belief that local agents are trained, skillful, careful and
reliable.17  Most of them are, and even business-wise policyholders rely
on them to take care of formalities needed to protect them when they
move.
When an agent fails to function in writing, his company can dis-
cipline him better than can his customers. The company calls for re-
ports, keeps in touch with him and his methods through special agents,
and picks up its supplies when too dissatisfied with him. A customer
can only take his business elsewhere. Companies required to carry
risks of agent misbehavior reflect the cost of that risk in reporting their
experience, which in turn affects premium rates. The uninsured policy-
holder is seldom a good bearer of losses which he has counted on his
insurance to cover. In the future more courts will use waiver, estoppel
and election rules to protect policyholders who tell their local agents
about removals of goods covered by fixed location policies.38
37. In Time Magazine, Jan. 7, 1957, p. 51, a full page advertisement of the Na-
tional Board of Fire Underwriters proclaims: "[W]hen it comes to insurance pro-
tection your local broker is an expert.... It is the business of a Capital Stock Com-
pany agent or broker to see that you get the proper insurance coverage and to help
you if you have a claim under your policy ... He is handy when you need him fast.
... He will see that you have the right kind of insurance.. "
38. Proof of loss formalities lie in the same category. Ordinarily all a policy
holder does is to notify the local agent informally; claim adjusters usually see that
satisfactory proof of loss is then prepared. When claim adjusters demand nothing
more formal and purport not to be dissatisfied, their conduct should ordinarily be
a company waiver. Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Dowdall, 159 Ill. 179, 42 N.E. 606
(1895). Automobile claims are treated the same way. Corporation of Royal Exchange
Assurance v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 644, 124 S.E. 172 (1924). But cf. Phoenix Ins. Co.
v. Fleming, 65 Ark. 54, 44 S.W. 464 (1898), in which adjuster warned policy holder
to make proof of loss.
A similar result is to be expected when a policy holder tells a local agent about
an increase of hazard. Orient Ins. Co. v. McKnight, 197 Ill. 190, 63 N.E. 399 (1902) ;
Reinhardt v. Security Ins. Co., 312 IIl. App. 1, 38 N.E.2d 310 (1941). These holdings
may, in part, reflect judges' distaste for the substance of the increase of hazard
clause; courts have interpreted this clause so that a policy holder is covered even
though he knows the insured property is subject to such dangers as temporary ex-
posure to open vessels of gasoline, Orient Ins. Co. v. Cox, 218 Ark. 804, 238 S.W.2d
757 (1951), or conspiracy to burn the insured property, Ampersand Hotel Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 198 N.Y. 495, 91 N.E. 1099 (1910).
Only the non-waiver clause comes in for distaste when a policy holder sells in-
sured property and tries to transfer insurance protection to the buyer. Good fire in-
surance underwriting is impossible unless identity of the insured is known. Courts are
not likely to make exceptions to the theory that fire policies do not insure transferees
of those named in absence of notification to the company and its consent. But see Cen-
tral Union Bank v. New York Underwriters' Ins. Co., 52 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1931).
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Companies should shoulder the risk of local agent misbehavior in
cases involving problems other than removal of property covered by
fixed location fire insurance. The difference between removal cases
and others earlier discussed is this: The agency problem is the only
problem in removal cases; in the other cases unjust or impolitic policy
restrictions on coverage are equally or more important. In sole owner-
ship clause cases, courts' willingness to impute a local agent's knowledge
to his company and hold the company responsible for his assurances is
less important than their willingness to disfavor the sole ownership
clause. In several other insurance clause cases the insured dealt di-
rectly with the home office and the court found a company election
based on its silence, rather than its assurances."9 The courts' motiva-
tion for finding election (rather than following other cases more favor-
able to insurance companies) probably lay in their distaste for the other-
insurance clause. Similarly, mistrust of the older types of vacancy
clause, as well as a desire to make companies stand back of their local
agents' assurances, probably motivated decisions favorable to policy-
holders who have left their homes for longer than the specified periods.
Courts, therefore, have two reasons for protecting policyholders. In
some cases the courts have tried to improve the insurance companies'
product; in others the courts have made companies stand back of their
local salesmen's assurances of what the product will do.
Company responsibility, however, is rarely enlarged merely be-
cause a company or its local agent suspects that a policyholder may fall
afoul of a policy stipulation. Only on title defects have courts held that
a fire insurer must either seek information or waive the sole ownership
clause defense. Insurers need not forever ask whether or not their
policyholders have bought other insurance, vacated their property, or
removed their goods from an insured location. Casual information
that a policyholder may sometime in the future be guilty of a breach
of warranty seldom (in itself) bars a warranty defense.4" But clear
Once, however, an agent gives informal consent to the transfer, courts are not likely
to be impressed with company argument that transfer must be in writing, especially
since agents normally have authority to insure the transferee by a new oral contract.
Andrews v. Equitable Fire Ins. Co., 236 N.Y. 573, 142 N.E. 289 (1923) ; Manchester
v. Guardian Assurance Co., 151 N.Y. 88, 45 N.E. 381 (1896). Contra, Margolies v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 125 A.2d 768 (N.H. 1956). For a workmen's com-
pensation case following the fire insurance majority view, see National Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 19 Cal.2d 540, 122 P.2d 1 (1942).
39. See, e.g., Swedish-Am. Ins. Co. v. Knutson, 67 Kan. 71, 72 Pac. 526 (1903).
40. In Watkins v. California Ins. Co., 296 Ky. 434, 177 S.W.2d 566 (1944), a
commercial policyholder violated a clause requiring him to keep his books after hours
in a fireproof safe or in a place not exposed to a fire in his store. Insured vainly
argued that agent's knowledge that he had no such safe relieved him from complying
with the clause. See also Cockendorfer v. Pendleton County Farmers' Fire Ins. Co.,
287 Ky. 735; 155 S.W.2d 204 (1941) ; Freed's Inc. v. American Home Fire Assurance
Co., 305 Mich. 89, 9 N.W.2d 923 (1943). But see German Am. Ins. Co. v. Hyman,
42 Colo. 156, 94 Pac. 27 (1908).
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notification to a local agent of facts uncovering a risk is likely to result
in expansion of fire insurance coverage in the absence of a disclaimer
warning the policyholder that he needs to take steps to protect himself.
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
Many automobile insurance waiver and estoppel problems are
like the fire insurance problems discussed earlier and can be passed
over quickly. Automobile policies still warrant sole ownership and
unencumbered title. Courts readily find these warranties waived. In
one case, for example, a local agent holding an automobile policy for
safe keeping ignored his promise of an endorsement permitting a mort-
gage; his company's breach of warranty defense was held waived."
In another case a used car dealer described his complicated financing
to a local agent who issued a policy warranting the cars unencumbered;
the court held the cars were encumbered by an equitable mortgage but
ruled out a breach of warranty defense.4 2  Some courts have held
breach of title warranties waived by the agent's failure to inquire about
the insured's title when the policy was issued.3 In a variety of other
cases the courts have required automobile insurers to stand back of
agents' assurances 44 and have protected policyholders against stipula-
tions on matters on which no questions were asked.4 5  These cases, too,
illustrate tendencies to treat insurance like commodities sold with
implied waranty of fitness and to strike down company attempts to
saddle policy buyers with the risk of local agent misperformance.
Occasionally the courts have overshot. In Collier v. General Ex-
change Ins. Corp.4 6 a collision policy covered the interests of both a car
buyer and a finance company. The buyer resold the car and attempted
41. Corporation of Royal Exchange Assurance of London v. Franklin, 158 Ga.
644, 124 S.E. 172 (1924).
42. Fountain v. Importers' & Exporters' Ins. Co., 214 Wis. 556, 252 N.W. 569
(1934). Again the court relied on a Wisconsin statute similar to that quoted in note
31 supra.
43. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Cash, 81 Ga. App. 102, 57 S.E.2d 708 (1950); Bird
v. Central Mfrs.' Mut. Ins. Co., 168 Ore. 1, 120 P.2d 753 (1942). Contra, Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Segler, 44 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1950).
44. Cappaert v. Emmco Ins. Co., 304 Mich. 130, 7 N.W.2d 244 (1943) (policy
warranted truck would be used in a 150 mile radius; insured notified an assenting
local agent with whom he had dealt for ten years that he planned to make hauls
longer than 150 miles) ; Robinson v. Empire Fire Ins. Co., 380 Pa. 499, 112 A.2d 146
(1955) (policy holder told clerk that policy misdescribed his second-hand trailer as
new). But see Drennan v. Sun Indemnity Co., 271 N.Y. 182, 2 N.E.2d 534 (1936)
(lack of authority held fatal to an agent's oral extension of the term of a liability
policy).
45. Davern v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 241 N.Y. 31, 150 N.E. 129 (1925)
(policy bought by mail warranted no claims for injuries or damages inflicted by auto-
mobile had ever been made against the insured and no company had ever cancelled an
auto policy issued to him).
46. 58 Ariz. 122, 118 P.2d 74 (1941).
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to assign his insurance to the new owner. The policy specified that it
became void on assignment or transfer before loss. The rew owner
paid off the encumbrance and notified the finance company (closely
affiliated with the insurer) of the facts. The finance company wrote
to the new owner and told him the policy could not be assigned and
warned him to get other insurance; the letter suggested that the new
owner send the policy to them for cancellation and recovery of un-
earned premium. The assignee responded by saying again that he would
like the insurance continued and transferred to him, and asking just
how much premium was unearned at the time he bought the car. The
reply said for a second time that the policy's protection could not be
transferred; the letter went on to say that the insurance company would
figure unearned premium from the day on which the company got back
the policy. The car was smashed up after the last letter was written
but before it was delivered. The court held the company liable for
this loss. The court's reasoning was: Company insistence that the
policy continued to earn premium until delivered up barred it from
asserting that protection expired earlier. The company tried to over-
reach the new owner. But the underwriting theory back of non-
transferability of automobile insurance without company consent is a
sound one; companies should have some rights in selecting their cus-
tomers and should not be required to accept any substitute a policy-
holder proposes. But the penalty for trying to collect too much
premium is not rationally set at the amount of damage an unaccepted
substitute happens to suffer. This holding transcends the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel; there was no agreement on the part of the com-
pany to insure the new owner and he had no basis for believing he could
rely on the company for protection. Adaptation of automobile insur-
ance to consumer needs does not call for this extreme decision.
Automobile Liability Insurance
In Gouch v. Halperin 7 a policyholder reported an accident to his
local agent. In the policyholder's presence the agent passed on the re-
port by long distance telephone to the company's home office. The
agent then told the policyholder he need make no further report. The
court held the agent's assurances waived policy stipulations calling for
detailed written notice of accident; the company was required to pay
a judgment recovered against the policyholder. The policy stipulation
for a written detailed report is a wise one; such reports often protect
both policyholder and company against unjust or exaggerated claims;
47. 306 Pa. 230, 159 Atl. 447 (1932).
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companies seldom are willing to forego their right to require the
policyholder to make an early, detailed, written statement. Nonethe-
less, untrained insurance buyers are not likely to appreciate the value
of a written report. They look to local agents to tell them what to do.
Companies foster this trust and cultivate public belief that local agents
are reliable friends of policyholders in distress. Under these circum-
stances the public is best served by holding insurance companies to
assurances like the one made by the local agent in the Gouch case-even
when policies expressly and unconditionally specify that the insured
must file a written report and stipulate that local agents may not waive
this requirement.
In Goldstein v. Bernstein"8 a company warned its policyholder
several times that it would withdraw from defense of a suit against her
if she were not in court when the trial started. Her rights and duties
were fully explained to her and she was inexcusably absent. Had she
paid the judgment entered against her and sued the company on the
policy, she had no shred of a chance for a holding that the company
had given up (or barred itself from asserting) its non-cooperation de-
fense. The cooperation requirement is in the public interest; without
it liability insurance premiums increase and cooperative customers must
then pay costs of others' non-cooperation. The injured third party in
the Goldstein case argued that the company was estopped from asserting
non-cooperation against him. When a company is estopped from assert-
ing a policy defense against the policyholder, most courts hold that the
policyholder's rights inure to the third party. But this was not the
case here; the third party had to establish a company waiver or estoppel
to himself. The court saw no basis for finding one and said the
company incurred no liability even though it had begun to defend the
suit.49 Some legislatures have protected third parties from financial
irresponsibility of policyholders by enacting statutes withholding some
policy defenses from companies otherwise liable to third parties.50 These
statutes usually entitle the company to reimbursement from the policy-
holder-a right of doubtful value when the third party has already had
difficulty in collecting his judgment from the policyholder.
A liability insurer is put to a difficult choice when it thinks it may
have a policy defense. If the company withdraws, and the policyholder
does a poor job of defending himself and the policy defense collapses,
48. 315 Mass. 329, 52 N.E.2d 559 (1943).
49. See also Clark Motor Co. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 172 Ore. 145, 139 P.2d 570
(1943) ; Allegretto v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co., 140 Ore. 538, 13 P.2d 647 (1932);
ntone v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 335 Pa. 134, 6 A.2d 566 (1939).
50. See e.g., Fallon v. Mains, 302 Mass. 166, 19 N.E.2d 68 (1939). Though the
Goldstein case was also a Massachusetts case, the statute was inapplicable because
claimant was a guest in insured's car, a class of claimants expressly excluded from the
statute's operation.
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the company will pay out more than if it had given the policyholder a
skillful, vigorous defense. On the other hand, if the company knows
facts which may constitute a policy defense, but nevertheless under-
takes to defend a suit against the policyholder, it may waive that de-
fense.
The best escape from this dilemma is between its horns; when the
company proposes to defend the policyholder only if he agrees that the
company thereby will lose none of its rights, and the policyholder ac-
cepts this proposal, the company can oppose the third party vigorously
and yet lose no defense it may have.5
Some policyholders will not accept the reservation of rights. Oc-
casionally a company defends without an accepted reservation of rights
and escapes a claim that it has waived its policy defenses. In Clark
Motor Co. v. United Pac. Ins. Co.52 a policyholder refused to agree to
a reservation of rights. He did nothing to defend himself, and entered
no objection when the company unsuccessfully defended for him. The
injured third party sued the company and contended that the company
lost its policy defenses by its conduct. The court said the company's
actions were not inconsistent with the later assertion of a policy defense
since they had in no way misled the policyholder; the court noted the
policyholder's failure to procure counsel, and found an implied consent
to the reservation of rights. This company sailed pretty close to the
line. In Gerka v. Fidelity & Cas. Co." the policyholder rejected a
reservation of rights and said he would hire his own lawyer and hold
the company liable for any judgment he had to pay. The company
made no offer to give him the papers in the action and continued his
defense. As in the Clark Motor case the policyholder made no further
objections. Nevertheless the court found that the company's conduct
raised a question of estoppel for the jury. This holding inured to the
benefit of the injured third party.
Liability insurers' policy defenses vary in strength. Some-
times a court that holds a company has waived a policy defense is
brushing away a mere straw, and one suspects that weakness of the
company's policy defense influences the holding more than strength of
proof of waiver.5 4 In other cases the policy defense is clear, and false
51. See, e.g., Allegretto v. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co., 140 Ore. 538, 13 P.2d 647
(1932).
52. 172 Ore. 145, 139 P.2d 570 (1943). See also Beatty v. Employers' Liab. Assur-
ance Co., 106 Vt. 25, 168 Atl. 919 (1933).
53. 251 N.Y. 51 167 N.E. 169 (1929).
54. In Beatty v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Co., 106 Vt. 25, 168 Atl. 919 (1933),
the company defended by claiming that insured's agreement with his mother to pay
expenses of a trip resulted in carriage for hire not covered by the policy. Court found
waiver in company's furnishing a defense after son refused to agree to a reservation
of rights.
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friendliness of adjusters who pull their companies out at the last
moment-while they pin down proof needed for a policy defense, or
wait to see just how serious the claim may be-so embarrasses the
policyholder's defense that estoppel seems eminently proper."5
An insurance company, by staying in a case, may stiffen the
claimant's persistence. Since a claim countenanced by an insurance
company has a nuisance value it might not have if the company pulled
out, prejudice to a policyholder can result from company participation.
Furthermore, few policyholders have the independent counsel they
need unless and until their liability insurers withdraw. A company
intending to withdraw, or to defend only if its reservation of rights is
accepted, does not have the same incentive to guard its policyholder's
interests that it has when recognizing its own liability. Perhaps courts
are, therefore, wise in readily finding waivers of policy defenses when
a company does not withdraw early and thereby warn the policyholder
to protect his own interests.
Desire to compensate injured third parties influences some courts
in deciding waiver and estoppel issues in liability insurance cases.
Liability insurance originally was only a contract of indemnity; it
looked solely to protection of the man who ,bought and paid for it.
Legislatures and insurance commissions, however, now are likely to
want to extend the protection of some liability policies to the policy-
holder's victim even when the policyholder is unable to pay the claim
and therefore has no need for indemnity. For example, the "bankruptcy
clause" in automobile policies extends company liabilities to judgment
creditors of their impecunious policyholders. The bankruptcy clause
is no help to an injured man when the company has a policy defense
against the policyholder.56 But the equity of bankruptcy-clause statutes
is served whenever a policyholder's rights are enlarged by a company's
loss of a policy defense. When courts use waiver or estoppel to deprive
companies of policy defenses they move in the same direction as that
taken by legislation or administrative action in enhancing the social
value of liability insurance.
5 7
LIFE INSURANCE
Delivery in Good Health
Life insurance policies often stipulate that they take effect only
after delivery in good health. Courts usually hang back when a
55. See Mancini v. Thomas, 113 Vt. 322, 34 A.2d 105 (1943).
56. Hyding v. Home Acc. Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P.2d 999 (1932).
57. But see Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th
Cir. 1949), in which the court so interpreted a provision of the Virginia Safety Re-
sponsibility Act withdrawing policies defenses from companies sued by third parties as
applying only to policies filed after an accident to comply with the act.
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beneficiary tries to offset the insured's poor health by proof that the
delivering agent knew the insured was sick and nevertheless handed
over his policy. Beneficiaries try this tactic only when the policyholder
dies shortly after delivery; when premiums have been paid for a couple
of years or more the incontestable clause puts an end to the delivery
in bad health defense and the beneficiary has no need to offset it with
a waiver or an estoppel reply.
Life insurance salesmen and medical examiners are not authorized
to write policies; they merely perfect applications and forward them to
home offices. The public knows that local representatives are not
authorized to make life insurance contracts. The public also knows that
the seriously ill are not insurable-that only by misleading home office
underwriters can local representatives get policies for -sufferers from
heart disease, cancer, tuberculosis and the like. These facts weigh
against a beneficiary of an insured in bad health on delivery. In
De Ford v. National Life and Acc. Ins. Co.58 the applicant had a bad
heart, syphilis and a newly patched hernia. He told the soliciting agent
about his bad health and said he was on the way to the hospital for
out-patient treatment; the salesman walked along with him and made
his pitch: "A man in your condition surely needs insurance." Both
insured and beneficiary knew insurance companies usually turned down
the applications of ill people. The court was not impressed with the
argument that the agent's knowledge -should be imputed to his com-
pany and that policy issuance should be held a waiver of the delivery
in good health clause. The court said that the agent, eager for his
commission, had a motive known to the applicant to conceal his knowl-
edge from his company; therefore the applicant knew the agent was
likely to suppress the facts. Most courts hold policies invalid in cases
so close to collusion." Even more honest applicants who know or
should know that they are uninsurable are seldom excused from com-
pliance with the delivery in good health clause on the ground that local
agents were told about their illnesses."
58. 182 Tenn. 225, 185 S.W.2d 617 (1945).
59. See, e.g., Mudge v. Supreme Court, I.O.F., 149 Mich. 467, 112 N.W. 1130
(1907); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luzio, 123 Ohio St. 616, 176 N.E. 446
(1931).
60. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Alterovitz, 214 Ind. 186, 14 N.E.2d 570 (1938);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Coddington, 131 N.J. Eq. 430, 26 A.2d 41 (1942); cf.
Koin v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ins. Ass'n, 41 P.2d 307 (Colo. 1935). See also
Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 385, 153 N.E. 844 (1926), a bur-
glary insurance case in which policy warranted that no other company had cancelled or
rejected application for insurance; insured tried unsuccessfully to excuse breach of
this warranty by showing the company's knowledge of the facts at time of issue. But
see Goldstein v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 10 N.J. Super. 291, 77 A.2d 51 (1950), in
which application showed heart disease and company nevertheless issued a policy; held
the company waived.
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The same courts that often impute the knowledge of local agents
of fire or automobile insurance companies to their principals have
reasons for different rulings when life insurance is involved. A re-
vealing pronouncement was made in Boucouvalas v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co.6 Insurance was written on the life of an uninsur-
able applicant who died soon after. The beneficiary proved that the
illiterate applicant answered health questions scrupulously but the local
agent (to garner his commission) wrote the answers falsely. The
court ruled the applicant's good faith immaterial and held for the
company. In rejecting the argument that the company-rather than its
customers-should bear the risk of disloyalty because it had appointed
a dishonest agent with authority to prepare applications, the court
stated:
"Whatever may be the situation with respect to policies of
fire insurance . . . where almost any property may be insured
at some premium, this argument . . . fails when applied to
policies of life insurance. The reason for this is that it regards
the plaintiff's [beneficiary's] loss of a benefit to which he was
not entitled as though it were a detriment to him. This is not so.
The only real loss sustained by the insured consisted in the sums
paid by him as premiums and these sums the insurer has tendered
back. To give the beneficiary the face of the policy would not be
to reimburse the insured, it would be to confer a gratuity upon
the plaintiff; it would serve to make the insured better off than
if no fraud had been committed. ,, 62
Most courts take quite seriously life insurance application and policy
provisions limiting local agents' authority when insurance is written on
uninsurable lives ---though similar provisions are brushed aside when,
61. 90 N.H. 175, 5 A.2d 721 (1939).
62. Id. at 179, 5 A.2d at 723.
63. See, e.g., Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Hulme, 136 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Conm'n
App. 1940) (existence of heart disease told to agent who suppressed this fact in ap-
plication).
The force of court understanding of public needs is illustrated strikingly by Ab-
bott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 375, 24 N.E.2d 87 (1939). The New York legis-
lature enacted an "entire policy" statute calling for life insurance policies that contain
the entire contract between the parties and forbidding incorporation by reference unless
a copy of the document referred to is attached to the policy when issued. The court,
nevertheless, held that an unattached application could be proved to show notice to the
applicant that local agents had no authority to waive the policy's delivery in good
health clause.
Earlier the court used this statute to ignore proof that policyholder's correct
answers were falsified by local agents who filled in the application blank for his
signature. Minsker v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 333, 173 N.E. 4
(1930). The court said the statute outmoded a long line of cases reaching the opposite
result. In Minsker the court did not know affirmatively that the policyholder was
uninsurable, but the beneficiary pulled the curtain of privilege over his ills by object-
ing to proof of the nature of his illness-which the beneficiary probably would not have
done were the policyholder insurable. But see Perry v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
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for instance, a fire insurance agent knows and fails to report that his
customer already has insurance in another company on the same risk, or
an automobile insurance agent knows of an unlisted encumbrance.6"
By so doing the courts protect life insurance premiums from an increase
redounding to the benefit of uninsurables.
Unfortunately the courts have gone too far in recognizing limits
on life insurance agents' authority. These limits should undo insurance
written on the lives of uninsurables, but insurable applicants deserve
better treatment. In Prevete v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.' an illiterate
applicant told the local agent about a back injury which put him in
the hospital for five days followed by out-patient treatment for three
months. The agent falsified his application so that it said he had no
recent illnesses and no recent workmen's compensation benefits. The
court held the policy void. Had the applicant connived with the
agent, the result would be defensible; life insurance companies are
entitled to applicants' candor. Had the applicant been uninsurable,
the result would be defensible; even candid uninsurables deserve only
repayment of premiums plus interest. But where should risk of agent
disloyalty rest when an insurable applicant foregoes chances to deal
with other companies and is scrupulous in his dealings with the agent
of the company to whom he applies? It is a risk that policy buyers are
not able to carry. It is a risk that insurance companies are prepared
to carry and one that companies can properly reflect in their premiums.6
Companies encourage prospects to rely on local agents in perfecting
life insurance applications; doctrines of waiver and estoppel are wisely
used to require companies to stand back of their agents' implied
representations that applications are in proper order.
Customer-protecting legal doctrines developed in fire and auto-
mobile insurance cases are adaptable for protection of deserving life
insurance buyers. They were used by the Colorado Supreme Court in
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fukushima17 a case in which a non-English
speaking applicant's interpreted answers were falsified by a local agent.
Report of the case does not show whether or not the applicant was
uninsurable; it states merely that falsity of the application was material
Co., 143 Mich. 290, 106 N.W. 860 (1906), in which local agent's knowledge that
applicant was a prostitute plus acceptance of premiums was held to be a waiver of the
truth of a representation that she was a housewife.
64. This protection of life insurance companies against waiver of delivery in good
health clauses extends to cases in which the agent after the policy has been issued
learns of breach and tries to assure the policyholder that his contract is valid. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Cridelle, 68 Ga. App. 353, 22 S.E.2d 771 (1942).
65. 343 Pa. 365, 22 A.2d 691 (1941).
66. But see Drilling v. New York Life Ins. Co., 234 N.Y. 234, 137 N.E. 314 (1922).
67. 74 Colo. 236, 220 Pac. 994 (1923).
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to the risk. The court refused to apply application and policy clauses
stipulating that the applicant is responsible for the agent's misdeeds.
But here is another chance for courts to overshoot and allow un-
insurable applicants to benefit when agents are disloyal. This happened
in Oredson v. Woodman of the World Life Ins. Soc'y,6s in which an
applicant, turned down three times because of heart disease, relied on a
smooth talking agent who falsified his fourth application. The court
ignored (1) proof that the policy was delivered with the falsified appli-
cation attached, (2) policy warranties of correctness of the health
representations, and (3) policy and application disclaimers of local
agents' authority to bind the company to terms other than those
specified. The court said the doctrine of estoppel cuts away artful de-
vices designed to saddle applicants with responsibility for agent mis-
conduct. The opinion has a high sound and would convince if the
court were trying to justify a return of premiums plus interest. Com-
pany liability for a local agent's misconduct can be satisfied by requiring
compensation for harm done; it does not necessarily call for payment
of undeserved benefits. The Oredson case was decided by a divided
court. The minority would hold with most courts who honor applica-
tion and policy provisions when agents write uninsurable risks. 9
Lapsed Policies
Life insurance companies are eager to keep in force policies on
lives of insureds in good health." Reinstatement provisions evidence
company willingness to excuse late premium payments under some
circumstances. If companies excused all tardiness without paying any
attention to health, they would, of course, get a ruinous selection of
risks; they would do a brisk business with sick delinquents; delinquents
in good health and long in default would buy new policies available on
terms more favorable than reinstatement costs.
Reinstatement is not the only route to waiver of late payment
There are cases of express or implied extensions of time for payment
made by officers with unquestioned authority to grant them.7' There
68. 211 Minn. 442, 1 N.W2d 413 (1941).
69. But see Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N.Y. 458, 176 N.E. 838
(1931), which for all practical purposes seems overruled by Abbott v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 281 N.Y. 375, 24 N.E.2d 87 (1939), discussed in note 63 supra.
70. In earlier times policyholders had no equity in reserves as they now do;
perhaps then some companies reached for the profits of lapses resulting in substantial
forfeitures.
71. See, e.g., Barbera v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 N.J.L. 122, 21 A.2d
222 (1941) ; Graham v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 72 N.J.L. 298, 62 At. 681 (1905).
For an unusual floater policy case involving home office implied consent to late pay-
ments, see Ellis-Jones Drug Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 158 Tenn. 237, 12 S.W2d 707
(1929).
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are also cases in which beneficiaries make unsuccessful, far-fetched
arguments that payment on time was waived or time for payment was
extended.72
Placement of the risk of unauthorized extension by local agents is
difficult. Agents usually have a personal interest in keeping policies in
force--they continue to get commissions so long as premiums are paid
on the policies they sell. Loyalty usually induces them to insist on their
company's rights in case of lapse, but when they exceed their authority
the policyholder's position is precarious.
When a policyholder allows life insurance to lapse, usually he does
not have the money to pay his premiums. If he cannot borrow it or
raise it by scrimping on other expenditures, an unauthorized extension
can be repudiated without doing him more harm than he would have
suffered without the extension-that is, he would have lost his policy
anyway. In these cases reliance cannot be to detriment and no estoppel
reason requires the company to honor its agent's unauthorized ex-
tension.73 Of course, waiver can be established without proof of reliance
to detriment, as illustrated by Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Norton. 4
In that case the local agent unquestionably was authorized to grant
some extensions. The issue raised was whether or not ambit of his
authority covered an extension after a default on a premium note. The
court held the proof adequate to carry this issue to the jury and support
its verdict for the beneficiary. The case was decided in 1878-when
lapses still could result in harsh total forfeitures; perhaps harshness of
such a forfeiture disposed the court toward the beneficiary's case. The
important point for us is, however, that the court found proof of the
agent's authority to relinquish voluntarily his company's rights, rather
than proof of an estoppel barring the company from asserting its rights.
In such a case authority to waive is the heart of dispute. A local agent's
attempt to waive his company's right to prompt payment was clearly
proved in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hall 5 but a finding that he
was unauthorized was fatal to the beneficiary's case.
Even though an agent's grant of an extension is unauthorized,
circumstances may warrant holding his company estopped to repudiate
his representation that later payment will be satisfactory. In Metro-
72. See, e.g., Vernon v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 15 Wash. 2d 94, 129 P.2d
801 (1942).
73. In Vernon v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, supra note 72, home office in
answer to policyholder's inquiry overstated slightly the amount due and mistakenly
told him he could not reinstate without meeting certain medical requirements. The court
said the beneficiary's proof showed no reliance by the policyholder on these company
statements, and to assume reliance would be bare conjecture. Therefore, no estoppel
was established.
74. 96 U.S. 234 (1878).
75. 104 Va. 572, 52 S.E. 345 (1905).
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politan Life Ins. Co. v. Hall proof tended to show detrimental reliance
on a short extension proffered by a collecting agent. The beneficiary-
the policyholder's mother-said she had money to pay the premium
but wanted to take care of her rent and pay the premium the next day.
The collecting agent agreed. The insured fell sick that night. The
court held that the company, in absence of proof of authority, was not
bound. If this 1905 case were tried today some courts might find the
beneficiary reasonably relied on the extension and then use either an
estoppel or apparent authority theory to reach the opposite result. This
may be another of those cases in which insurance companies should be
required to carry the risk of misbehavior of their agents in whom
ordinary consumers are likely to put trust.
My theory that public need should be a measure of agents' powers
should be no help to some policyholders claiming waivers or estoppels.
In Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Lawson 76 quarterly premiums were pay-
able at the company's home office and the local agent had no authority
to appoint another place of payment. Nevertheless, the local agent
accepted cash for five premiums and forwarded his personal check for
each to the home office. The company sent receipts directly to the
policyholder. When the policyholder tendered a sixth premium the
agent, tired of wet nursing the policyholder, refused it and told him to
send it to the home office. The policyholder had time to comply, but
made no further attempt to pay this or the next premium. The bene-
ficiary argued that the company had permanently waived home office
payment and therefore the unaccepted tender to the local agent kept the
policy in force until the insured died (four months later and after another
premium had fallen due). The court saw no sensible basis for the
insured's supposition that he was privileged to continue to ignore terms
of the policy and held that the policy had lapsed. The court pushed too
far, however, and said that waiver is always a form of estoppel binding
on an insurance company only when disavowal would defraud a trust-
ing policyholder. Insurance companies can (and occasionally do)
intentionally forgive policyholders' shortcomings. Even though such
acquittance works a boon on a policyholder who would otherwise have
no way of keeping his policy in force (and therefore does not rely to
detriment) the company cannot retreat from such a waiver. The
theory of voluntary waiver is misapplied only when a court holds a
company has waived its rights without adequate proof of company
intention to relinquish those rights.
76. 137 Tex. 399, 153 S.W.2d 953 (1941). See also Palumbo v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 293 Mass. 35, 199 N.E. 335 (1935).
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Inviting or Permitting Proof of Loss
Beneficiaries occasionally argue that life insurance companies lose
those defenses of which they have knowledge if they nevertheless insist
on proof of death. In Knights and Ladies of Columbia v. Shoaf 77 the
insured was pregnant when her policy was issued and that fact had been
disclosed in her application. The company issued the policy only after
she agreed that no benefits would be payable if death resulted from that
pregnancy. She did die from this excepted cause. The beneficiaries
argued that nevertheless the company was liable on the policy because
with knowledge of the facts the company required the beneficiaries to
submit proof of death, have a guardian appointed for a minor bene-
ficiary, and travel to meet with a company officer. The court held that
the company's acts constituted neither a waiver of defenses nor a
representation which the company was estopped to deny.7" Companies
should be deterred from putting claimants to annoying, costly, worthless
trouble, but the appropriate deterrent is not expanded life insurance
coverage. Protection of ordinary consumers does not require such
drastic penalties against companies whose institutional arrangements
sometimes result in asking for proof of death from claimants whose
claim is known to be worthless to some employe other than the one who
suggests filing of proof of death. It will not be surprising, however,
when a court strikes down a defense it wishes to disfavor on the ground
that an insurance company invitation to make a proof of loss constitutes
a waiver or an estoppel.
CONCLUSION
If this paper throws new light on the law it does so because of its
narrow focus-resulting from classifying cases on the basis of
underwriting problems, rather than on the basis of purely legalistic
resemblances. The cases are a buzzing confusion when different kinds
of insurances are talked about at the same time. Many, though of
course not all, of the inconsistencies disappear or become understandable
when the cases are classified in terms of business functions. I believe
that a lawyer who is interested in evaluating a waiver or estoppel issue
should be especially interested in finding cases closely in point. If he
views a melange of authorities he is likely to be misled; if he tries to
use them in argument he may find himself surprised and bested.
77. 166 Ind. 367, 77 N.E. 738 (1906).
78. See also Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N.W. 242
(1920), in which the beneficiary's case was even weaker. For a similar holding in a fire
insurance case, see Draper v. Oswego County Fire Relief Ass'n, 190 N.Y. 12, 82 N.E.
755 (1907).
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This does not mean that there are no main intellectual currents that
cut across the law of waiver and estoppel. On proof that a company
acting through clearly authorized agents unequivocally gave up a policy
defense, virtually all courts will rule that the defense has been waived.
On proof that a company official acting unquestionably within the scope
of his employment made a clear representation of past or present fact
to an insured who relied on that fact to his detriment, virtually all
courts will hold the company estopped to deny that representation.
But real cases rarely fall into such well-defined patterns, and justice
is not captured in this area by looking only to black letter definitions of
waiver and estoppel. Policy stipulations that produce injustice are in
fact more vulnerable to claims of waiver and estoppel than policy stipu-
lations that limit company liability in the public interest. Courts are
more likely to find that agents have acted with authority or within the
scope of their employment when to do so deprives the company of an
unjust defense than they are when to do so extends company liabilities
beyond risks properly underwritten for a just premium. Courts are
likely to respect limits on agents' authority and the scope of their
employment when the company is justly entitled to cast the risk of their
own agents' misbehavior on the public, but the limits on agents' func-
tions described in application and policy fine print will seldom protect
an insurance company against risks it should bear in a world in which
most insurance is sold to non-experts as a commodity-especially since
companies themselves have urged the public to rely in various ways on
their local agents. The lawyer who looks at the agency law of these
cases only as examples of more general law of master and servant and
principal and agent, is likely, again, to find black letter uncomforting
and misleading.
All state legislatures have put some checks on policy writers:
Statutes ban or dictate various policy stipulations; insurance commis-
sioners have been given powers to control insurance contracts in the
public interest. Perhaps legislative and administrative protection of
policyholders will some day so occupy the field that judicial participa-
tion will be unwarranted and presumptuous. Certainly legislators and
administrators can make wider studies of public needs and insurance
company capacities than can the courts. But in the last hundred years
the courts have played an important role in thwarting some impolitic in-
roads on policy coverages-quite a different role from that of eighteenth
century judges who looked on policy buyers with glowering severity.
Modem courts have adapted insurance coverage to public needs in
a variety of ways. Clauses called warranties in the eighteenth century
are often held non-contractual in the twentieth. Modem courts often
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construe warranties so that eighteenth century breaches are twentieth
century conformities. Some breaches that would have relieved eight-
eenth century coffee-house underwriters from liability are not twentieth
century defenses. The body of this paper has been concerned with
none of these, but with one other route to adaptation-court holdings
that a company has so acted that it has lost a defense it could otherwise
have asserted. It has been this paper's thesis that in this last respect
twentieth century courts have tended to act wisely; that they have
generally respected the public needs both in expanding liability and in
refusing to go further than they have done. Of course this is only true
of the main stream of judicial decision; it would be too much to expect
that all eddies would run clear and never overflow.
The insurance industry itself has often seen that its interests do
not diverge from the public interest; new policy stipulations have often
widened coverage. Companies have extended both service performed
for the public and the profits earned for themselves. The industry
should not be criticized for taking reasonable steps to protect its funds
and its customers' interests from risks that cannot be properly under-
written and justly reflected in the premiums collected. The courts
should protect the public by not extending coverage too far, as well
as by extending it far enough.
